Using a very large sample of matched author-referee pairs, we examine how referees' and authors' genders affect the referees' recommendations. Relying on changing author-referee matches, we find no evidence of gender differences among referees in charitableness, nor is there any effect of the interaction between the referees' and authors' genders. With substantial laboratory research showing gender differences in fairness, the results suggest that outside the laboratory, an ethos of objectivity can overcome possible tendencies toward same-group favoritism or oppositegroup discrimination.
I. Introduction
D ISCRIMINATION is perhaps the most heavily researched topic in the field of labor economics and perhaps even among all endeavors in applied economics. Much less has been done on differences in fairness or charitableness by individuals with different characteristics, but that too is attracting increasing attention (Andreoni & Vesterlund, 2001; Croson & Gneezy, 2009 ). Very little research has combined these two topics, asking whether the amount of favoritism or discrimination varies with the extent of the match between the parties (but see Parsons et al., 2011, and Price & Wolfers, 2010 , for differences by race/ethnicity, and Dillingham, Ferber, & Hamermesh, 1994 , for some sparse evidence on gender).
Our purpose here is to combine these two questions, focusing on differences by gender. We ask whether women are more or less generous than men in making up-or-down recommendations about others' work and whether their degree of generosity is affected by the gender of those whose output they are asked to judge. While we despair of distinguishing favoritism toward one's own group from discrimination against another, our results do provide some evidence on whether the extent of favoritism or discrimination differs by gender of the favoring or discriminating party.
Perhaps analogous to the theory of religious sects (Iannaccone, 1992) , one might argue that the degree of solidarity within a group is a function of its relative size: smaller groups will be more cohesive and more likely to favor other members of the group. We test this possibility too, examining whether women favor other women more when they account for a smaller share of the relevant population of those making the judgments or being judged.
II. Modeling Preferences and Favoritism
We seek to model interactions between members of two groups, with within-group distinctions by gender. Call the two groups authors and referees. Their members interact on what they perceive to be a one-to-one basis, with authors seeking a judgment of their work, referees either giving their approval or not. Denote authors as A i (i ¼ 1,. . ., I) and referees as R j (j ¼ 1,. . ., J). Denote the gender of an author or referee by f(A i ) or f(R j ), equaling 1 for females and 0 for males. The utility of referee R j when matched with author A i is
The terms l i and w j denote idiosyncratic values of author i's work and referee j's valuation of papers, respectively. Finally, there is some randomly distributed unobservable effect, e ij , that results with each author-referee match. A paper is recommended for acceptance if
which occurs with probability
To understand the meaning of the parameters in equation (3), view the idiosyncratic l i and w j as random draws, so that the composite error term is e ij ¼ l i þ w j þ e ij . Letting G(.) denote the cdf of Àe ij , the effect of female authorship on a male referee's acceptance probability is G(a) À G(0) and on a female referee's acceptance probability is
This difference-in-difference will be positive (negative) if female referees are comparatively more (less) generous than male referees when matched with female authors.
The formulation of utility in equation (1) implicitly assumes that the referees j can identify the gender of authors i. Generalizing equations (1) and (3) to account for the possibility that the identity of authors is known only in some cases, we obtain
where Z ij is an indicator of whether f(A i ) is known to referee j. With this expanded formulation, we would expect k ¼ 0 and would infer whether there is within-group favoritism from the difference-in-difference effect, which for
III. Matching Data to the Model
In order to estimate the parameters describing charity and favoritism, we need a panel of referees and authors that is sufficiently long that individual idiosyncrasies can be accounted for through multiple observations on the same referee matched to different authors. Referees should also be aware of the author's gender, so that there is scope for them to indulge their preferences, if any, for their own gender. Obviously the latter problem does not arise in laboratory work: parties' gender can, if the experimenter desires, be identified to others. The former problem generally cannot, however, be handled extensively in what are typically very short-duration laboratory experiments.
Our data set contains all the submissions to a leading field journal that were sent out to referees between 1986 and early 2008. Confidentiality restrictions mean we have only the first names of all referees and most authors, but no information on last names. The journal had a strict policy of double-blind refereeing, so that it took some effort for referees to discover whether they matched the author's gender. We cannot know whether they knew that a match did or did not exist-whether Z ¼ 1 or 0. Evidence from another journal (Blank, 1991) , however, suggests that even in the late 1980s, referees could identify authors of half the assigned papers. This fact suggests that Z ¼ 1 for many observations.
In case the ease of identifying authors has changed, we need a proxy for Z that might indicate whether it was possible for the referee to make this discovery. Today it is easy to discover the identity of the authors of an unpublished scholarly paper by doing an Internet-based search for its title. Such Internet discovery was presumably far less prevalent during the early part of our sample. 2 We thus proxy Z by dividing the sample into three periods: 1986-1994, when authors' gender could not be identified using the Internet (but perhaps could be through working paper series, direct knowledge of the paper, or something else); 2000-2008, when it could be identified easily using the Internet; and 1995-1999, when the degree of identifiability using the Internet may have been unclear. In most of our comparisons and estimation, we drop matches from this middle period. To the extent that authors' gender is more likely to be known to the referee (Z ¼ 1) in the late period (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) than in the early period (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) , our ability to detect statistically a gender-matching effect would be greater in the late period.
There were 2,940 initial submissions sent to at least one referee. In the early period, not all authors' given names were listed in the data file, so that, as table 1 shows, for only 70% of the papers were all the authors identifiable. In the later period, the records were nearer to being complete. Authors' gender was completely identifiable on 80% of the manuscripts, with our inability to identify authors' gender due mostly to ambiguity about the gender identification of various given names. Around one-sixth of the papers for which the gender of all authors could be identified had only female authors, and one-third had at least one female. Both fractions increased between the early and late periods, significantly so for the ''any female'' category. Our regression analysis focuses on the ''any female'' classification as the indicator of female authorship (f(A i ) ¼ 1).
The journal used 6,165 referees to judge these papers, and we identified the gender of all but 32. A total of 1,514 different referees judged papers during this time period. One instance of refereeing was most common, but 179 individuals judged at least ten manuscripts. Of the identifiable referees, 19% were women, a percentage that increased significantly between the early and late periods, as table 2 demonstrates.
The identification strategy here relies on multiple matches between a referee and a variety of authors and multiple matches of a particular article to referees. It is thus identical to the strategy used to identify firm-worker match effects by Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) and, in the context of discrimination, by Parsons et al. (2011) . This approach is unaffected by the identity of the (very few) editors, so long as they do not assign referees to articles based on their belief that particular referees will or will not discriminate or show favoritism based on the gender of the authors.
As table 2 also shows, the matching of authors and referees was not random by gender over the entire period: female referees were more likely to be matched with papers that had any or all female authors. This was not true during the early period. The relatively few papers that had female authors were only slightly more likely than others to be 
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CHARITY AND FAVORITISM IN THE FIELD assigned a female referee, but in the late period, there was more gender matching, especially of papers on which all authors were women. The difference in the extent of gender matching with female-authored papers may reflect the specialization of women in certain subfields. Regardless, this phenomenon justifies accounting for this nonrandomness in our estimation.
If younger referees are assigned lower-quality papers and female referees are younger than males, it would be difficult to identify the effects that we seek to measure. It is true that women constituted a growing proportion of the economics profession over this period (Donald & Hamermesh, 2006) , so that female referees were probably on average younger (and presumably less experienced) than males. Evidence from a matched sample of referees and authors from what is arguably the leading economics journal (Hamermesh, 1994) suggests, however, almost no quality-matching by reputation of authors and referees.
Each referee was asked to rate the assigned paper on a four-point scale: accept, accept with minor changes, accept with major changes, or reject. As the first two columns of table 3 indicate, referees recommended that roughly half the papers be rejected. A recommendation of outright acceptance is extremely rare. Most positive recommendations involve the referee's asking for major changes in the manuscript. The crucial thing to note in the table is the comparison by gender. In the entire sample, and in each subperiod, there is absolutely no evidence of any difference in charitableness by gender. Chi square tests are very far from rejecting the null hypothesis that the distributions of judgments by male and female referees are the same. Ignoring possible gender differences in the quality of papers that are assigned, the evidence in table 3 is consistent with the view that the women judging others' work were no more or less charitable than their male counterparts within any time period. 3 Comparing responses across periods, however, suggests a slightly different implication. While the rejection rate among males rose by 2.1 percentage points between the two periods, the rejection rate among female referees rose by 11.0 percentage points, a double-difference of 8.9 percentage points (s.e. ¼ 3.9). The women who refereed in the late period were significantly less charitable than their male counterparts, as compared to the earlier period. Figure 1 graphs two-year moving averages of the fraction of papers on which a no-reject recommendation was given by female referees and male referees. The temporal decline appears to be continuous, not something that occurred suddenly during the middle period when the Internet became widely accessible. Although there is a lot of year-to-year variation, except for the first biennium, one year of which included only four female referees, there is little evidence of discontinuities in these series. There were trends, underlining the desirability of distinguishing between subperiods, but no permanent sharp changes.
To examine the charitableness issue formally and test for gender-matched favoritism, table 4 presents estimates of model (3). With very few recommendations of outright acceptance or even acceptance with minor revisions, we define the outcome as nonreject versus reject. 4 Moreover, GENDER, PERCENTAGES, 1986 -2008 Full Sample, 1986 -2008 Early Period, 1986 -1994 Late Period, 2000 -2008 , 1986-2008 1986-2008 1986-1994 2000-2008 3 Referees' views do matter. All thirteen papers rated ''accept'' by at least one referee and not below ''accept with minor revision'' by the others were eventually published in the journal. Also, there is substantial, but far from complete, agreement on quality by referees. For example, if one referee rated a paper at least ''accept with minor revision,'' 28% of the other referees (in two-referee cases) also rated it this highly. 4 Estimation that takes advantage of the fourfold classification yields results that are qualitatively identical to those based on the condensed reject or no-reject classification.
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THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS since the interesting hypotheses concern the interaction variables in model (3 0 ), table 4 reports results from estimation of a linear probability model (LPM) so that marginal effects are easily inferred. 5 The Female author variable is defined to be equal to 1 if any of the manuscript's authors are female. Results using the ''all female authors'' classification are extremely similar (see Abrevaya & Hamermesh, 2010) and omitted in the interest of space. The sample is restricted to manuscripts in the early period (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) and the late period (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) , with the indicator variable late defined to be equal to 1 for the latter. 6 The reported standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the referee level. 7 In table 4, we consider three specifications (columns 1-3) that build up to the full triple-interaction specification in the model in the last of these three columns. Column 1 includes just the Female Author Â Female Referee interaction; column 2 adds the interactions Late Â Female Author and Late Â Female Referee; and column 3 adds the triple interaction Late Â Female Author Â Female Referee. Col-umns 4 to 6 present the same three specifications but with referee-specific effects also included, thereby using only within-referee variation in the explanatory variables (so that the female referee coefficient is not identified). All the specifications include a linear time trend (Year). Although we have no information on referee characteristics (other than gender), we include a quadratic in experience, the number of previous times a person had refereed for the journal.
The results across specifications in table 4 yield the same conclusions about the possibility of gender favoritism. It is simply not evident in these data. In column 1, where the interaction effect is assumed to be the same in the early and late periods, the coefficient estimate on Female Author Â Female Referee is small (2.67 percentage points) and statistically insignificant. When interactions with Late are introduced in column 2, the coefficient estimate for Female Author Â Female Referee remains small (3.54 percentage points) and statistically insignificant.
This specification does highlight some trends (early period versus late period) that are unrelated to favoritism/charity. Specifically, as indicated by the Late Â Female Referee estimate, the referee-gender effect changes significantly from the early to the late period. Similar to the raw data, female referees are 2.89 percentage points less likely than male referees to reject a male-authored paper in the early period and 7.12 percentage points more likely in the late period. Also, the significant positive estimate on Late Â Female Author indicates a large change in the author-gender effect from the early to late period (female-authored papers 4.48 percentage points more likely to be rejected by a male referee in the early period and 2.29 percentage points less likely in the late period). This change does not necessarily reflect anything about gender favoritism, however, as an increase in the quality of female-authored papers could be the cause.
The complete specification in column 3 yields an estimate of the triple-interaction coefficient very close to 0 and statistically insignificant. There is no evidence that the favoritism or discrimination effect changed from the early to the late period. Moreover, the point estimates in each period are close to 0, with female referees 4.42 percentage points (z-statistic ¼ 0.72) less likely to reject a femaleauthored paper (as opposed to a male-authored paper) in the early period and 3.04 percentage points (z-statistic ¼ 0.64) less likely in the late period. Overall, the results for the separate subperiods in column 3 show no apparent favoritism or discrimination based on gender matching or nonmatching. 8 When we include referee effects in the LPM estimation (table 4, columns 4-6) and therefore use only within-referee FIGURE 1.-TWO-YEAR MOVING AVERAGE RATE OF NONREJECT RECOMMENDATIONS, BY GENDER, 1987 -2008 variation, the results remain qualitatively very similar (with slightly higher standard errors, as expected). There are some changes in the magnitudes of the female-author effects (the coefficients on female author and Late Â Female Author), but the estimates related to favoritism or discrimination change little from their counterparts in columns 1 to 3. For the complete specification in column 6, we find that female referees are 2.49 percentage points (z-statistic ¼ 0.30) less likely to reject a female-authored paper (as opposed to a male-authored paper) in the early period and 4.33 percentage points (z-statistic ¼ 0.62) less likely in the late period. 9 To allow the possibility that the relevant idiosyncrasies were manuscript rather than referee specific, we also estimated a model that included manuscript effects rather than referee effects. Again, the author-referee gender interaction was insignificantly different from 0 in both periods. The coefficient estimates on Female Author Â Female Referee and Late Â Female Author Â Female Referee were 0.0178 (s.e. ¼ 0.1030) and À0.209 (s.e. ¼ 0.1291), respectively. Finally, when go a further step to account for both referee and manuscript idiosyncrasies, we find no qualitative differences (although standard errors increase, as expected with the increase in the number of fixed effects).
The estimates reported in table 4 do not account for the possibility, suggested by the across-period comparisons in table 3, that a change in the mix of referees altered observed behavior between periods. Perhaps women who refereed during the early period were inherently more favorable to female authors but could not observe authors' gender, while female referees who entered the refereeing pool during the late period discriminated against female authors. This might have occurred because of the increase in female representation in the set of referees-possibly a reduced sense of solidarity among later cohorts of female economists. If this were correct, we would estimate k 0 ¼ 0, even though the agents' preferences exhibited favoritism in one case (the early referees) and discrimination in the other case (the new referees in the late period).
To examine this possibility, we restricted the sample to the 295 individuals who refereed in both the early and late periods. The estimates for this reduced sample are presented in table 5. Only the complete-specification (triple interaction) results are reported, with columns 1 and 2 of table 5 corresponding to columns 3 and 6 of table 4, respectively. A comparison of the results to table 4 suggests that the apparent lack of favoritism or discrimination was not the result of a change in the mix of referees. Even within this subsample, there is no evidence of a significant change in behavior toward female authors across the subperiods or of any favoritism overall. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the referee level, are reported in parentheses. The sample size for the referee-effects specifications (columns 4-6) includes only referees having variation in their nonreject recommendations (that is, not all 0s or 1s for the dependent variable). 9 Another potentially confounding problem is a gender difference in self-selection. Willingness to complete the assigned task may differ by gender, with women perhaps being more compliant (as they are in their propensity to complete surveys- Moore & Tarnai, 2002) . Differential selectivity will bias the results only if the propensity to complete the task is related to differences in the charitableness of doers and refusers. We cannot get at this problem since we have no information on noncompliant referees. If men are more likely not to comply and noncompliers are nastier, then our results are biased in favor of finding that female referees are less charitable than males. A related difficulty may arise from the selection of referees by editors. We cannot solve this problem completely, but the fact that the fraction female referees is slightly above the fraction of female in the American Economic Association (Donald & Hamermesh, 2006) should allay some concerns about this issue.
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IV. Conclusions and Implications
Whereas many previous studies have found differences in altruism by gender, our examination of a unique and very large sample on author-referee outcomes in a high-stakes field environment yields no evidence of gender differences. Even accounting for the idiosyncrasies of both the judge and the judged, we still find no such differences. Moreover, there is no evidence of relative favoritism toward one's own gender. The answers to the two subtitular questions in this study are no.
Female and male economists, at least in this specific setting, appear to behave similarly and in a gender-neutral manner. This might be the result of some inherent sense of fairness, with participants feeling that exercising their prejudices is inappropriate in this particular judging activitythat ''their own identity is often tied to their self-concept as experts who are able to stand above their personal interest'' (Lamont, 2009, p. 9) . Moreover, given the absence of an interaction of experience with gender, our results suggest either that there is no self-selection by gender attitudes or that fairness or nondiscrimination develops very early in scholars' professional careers. Combined with previous findings, the results imply that gender differences in fairness and favoritism are context specific. Future research, including laboratory experiments, might examine how the extent of fairness or lack of favoritism depends on the perceived importance of the particular two-sided relationship. 10 The samples include only referees who reviewed in both the early (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) and late (2000-2008) periods. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the referee level, are reported in parentheses. ''Female author'' is equal to 1 if any of the paper's authors is female. The sample size for the referee-effects specification in column 2 includes only those referees having variation in their nonreject recommendations (that is, not all 0s or 1s for the dependent variable). 10 A recent example of a much smaller gender difference in behavior in the real world as compared to laboratory results is Manning and Saidi (2010) , although unlike ours, that study could not be based on random matching.
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